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JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION REGIMES:
COMPARING THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
ADMINISTRATION IN IRAQ WITH THE ISRAELI MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL
DR. HILLY MOODRICK-EVEN KHEN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Juvenile justice has become a theme of great interest, with the international
community showing a growing concern with protecting the rights of children under
international lawi-in times of peace as well as in times of war.2 This article
examines the juvenile justice systems unique to occupation regimes, basing the
analysis of this type of system on the case studies of the Israeli occupation in the
administered territories and the former Coalition Provisional Authority
Administration ("Coalition") in Iraq.3 We maintain that the changing nature of
occupation regimes has bearing on their juvenile justice systems, demanding more
protections for the rights of children within these criminal structures. These
protections can be awarded either through direct application of human rights law or
by amending the specific laws that administer territories under occupation.
In order to determine the most adequate set of international norms for
securing the interests of juveniles within the juvenile justice systems in occupied
territories, we need to assess the tenets and objectives of juvenile justice in general.
This is the object of the second section of this paper, in which we discuss the major
goals of juvenile justice both in comparative law and in international law. We
address the current trends and characteristics of juvenile justice systems worldwide
vis-i-vis the goals of the juvenile justice system as they are reflected in
international law, most notably in the International Covenant on Civil and Political

*Dr. Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen is Senior Lecturer of public international law at Sha'arei Mishpat
College Israel; LL.D, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2007); M.A. in philosophy (Magna Cum
Laude), Tel Aviv University (2001); LL.B, The Interdisciplinary Center of Herzlyia (2000); B.A. in
humanities, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1996).
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
Under international law, the legal definition of a "child" is embedded in the CRC, which stipulates, "a
child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier." Id. art. 1. We shall adhere to this definition in the article.
2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 14, 17,
23, 24, 38, 50, 82, 89, 94, 132, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV]
(highlighting the rights of children within and during an armed conflict).
3. Several terms are used to describe the territories in the article, such as the "Occupied
Palestinian Territories," the "West Bank Territories," and "Judea and Samaria." We have chosen the
term that appears in the title, which has, to our mind, no political connotations. We also use a shortened
term: the "administered territories."
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Rights ("ICCPR"),4 the International Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"), and subsequent soft law instruments.
As our interest is not simply in the juvenile justice systems that operate within
independent states and regimes but more specifically in those that are implemented
in occupied territories, we proceed, in the third section, to examine the history of
the changes experienced by occupation regimes: from belligerent occupations to
transformative occupations and from short-term to long-term ones. We then
examine how these transformations affect the legal means for realizing the
obligations of the occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)6
and the Hague Convention and its annexed regulations (1907) ("Hague
Regulations"), primarily the duty to ensure the safety and the daily life routine of
the occupied population.
In the fourth section, we discuss the mutual application of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law in occupied territories
through the prism of the objectives of the juvenile justice system in general, and in
occupied territories in particular.
We first suggest that the longer an occupier rules in an occupied territory, the
more likely that human rights law, rather than humanitarian law, will better serve
the interest of the occupied population, as the latter has more limited tools for
achieving this goal. Hence, in longer-term occupations, there is more room for the
application of human rights law as an interpretative and complementary law. We
then return to the conclusions of the second section with regard to the objectives of
juvenile justice systems and claim that, given the nature of juvenile justice in
general, and in occupied territories in particular, we must see a more extensive
application of human rights law in occupation regimes. We substantiate our claims
through the analysis of the case study of detention, prosecution, and adjudication
of children in formerly occupied Iraq.
In the fifth section, we turn to Israel, discussing the juvenile courts and the
legislation of the juvenile justice system in the territories administered by the
Israeli army. After addressing the legal views expressed by the Israeli government
and the Israeli Supreme Court on the question of the applicability of human rights
law in the administered territories, we address the recent developments in juvenile
justice in these territories. We propose that the long-term nature of the Israeli
occupation in the administered territories demands that Israel keep and strengthen
the reform in the juvenile justice system in these territories in order to increase the
application of human rights norms. However, in the specific case of Israel,
international law is not automatically incorporated within the national legal
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
[hereinafter ICCPR] (the relevant articles for this paper will include article 10 and 14).
5. CRC, supra note 1.
6. GCIV, supranote 2.
7. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations] (also referred
to as the Fourth Hague Convention) (in this piece, articles will be referencing the articles in the
regulations found in its annex).
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system, and furthermore, Israel objects to the application of human rights treaties
in the administered territories. These two facts lead us to conclude that the best
way to apply human rights norms, found in both formal and soft law instruments,
in the occupation regime in the administered territories is by incorporating them
into the legislation of the military governance that regulates the administered
territories.
II.

THE OBJECTIVES OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS

In order to determine the appropriate set of norms for governing juvenile
justice systems in general and in occupied territories in particular, we must
extrapolate a definition of such systems, clarifying their basic tenets and
objectives. The Council of Europe defines a juvenile justice system as:
[T]he formal component of a wider approach for tackling youth crime.
In addition to the youth court, it encompasses official bodies or agencies
such as the police, the prosecution service, the legal profession, the
probation service and penal institutions. It works closely with related
agencies such as health, education, social and welfare services and non8
governmental bodies, such as victim and witness support.
The Council states that the principal aims of a juvenile justice system are to
"i. prevent offending and re-offending; ii. to (re)socialise and (re)integrate
offenders; and iii. to address the needs and interests of victims." 9
Scholars identify three central principles in juvenile justice: "diminished
responsibility, proportionality and room to reform."o
Diminished responsibility refers to the question whether children
are less culpable then adults for having offended. Children may lack
sufficient cognitive abilities to realize what they are exactly doing and
in particular what might be the consequences of their acts. Of course
the older the juvenile the more he will be responsible for his acts, but
even at age 14 and 16 he might be incapable of grasping the full
meaning of his actions.
Proportionalityrefers to the mitigation of punishment because of
children's lack of development of social and cognitive capacities. . . .
Room to reform indicates the importance

of the kind of

punishments that is meted out, considering what we want to achieve
with punishment and what we would want to avoid."

8. Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation, 853rd Meeting, Rec(2003)20 (2003) (this
recommendation is for "new ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency and the role of juvenile
justice"), availableat https://wed.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=70063.
9. Id.
10. Josine Junger-Tas, Trends in International Juvenile Justice: What Conclusions can be
Drawn?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 505, 510 (Josine Junger-Tas & Scott. H.

Decker eds., 2006).
I1. Id. (citation omitted).
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According to this final principle, for example, preference should be given to
penal interventions that promote rehabilitation and the growth of young people into
responsible citizens. 12
The above basic principles of juvenile justice are the result of a long process
of development of the concepts of juvenile justice in 20th-century Western
thought. This ranged from the rhetoric of child protection and "meeting needs" of
the 1970s, where justice for juveniles was considered best delivered through
community-based interventions, to the series of diverse "justice-based" principles
of the late 20th century, which were "more concerned with responding to the
'deed' of the offence rather than the 'need' of the offender." 3 These changes are
reflected in the variety of policies in the juvenile justice systems implemented by
Western states, which scholars divide into three clusters:
The first cluster includes the English speaking countries, with the
exception of Scotland but including the Netherlands. It is essentially
"justice" oriented, characterized by a retributive, sometimes repressive,
approach, placing a strong emphasis on the juvenile's accountability,
"just desert" principles and parental responsibility for their child's
behaviour ....
The second cluster of countries mainly covering continental
Europe is still very much "welfare" oriented ....
A third cluster is formed by the Scandinavian countries and
Scotland [that combines approaches from "just desert" and "welfare"].' 4
In the third cluster, the "just desert" philosophy gained an important role
because of their relationships with Anglo-Saxon states.' 5 In practice, these policies

12. Id.

13. John Muncie & Barry Goldson, States of Transition: Convergence and Diversity in
International Youth Justice, in COMPARATIVE YOUTH JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES 197 (John Muncie &
Barry Goldson eds., 2006).
14. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 526-28
It is clear that the United States represents these characteristics [of the first cluster] in its
extreme form . . . . On the other hand most of these countries-while subscribing to the
general just desert philosophy-have also introduced on a large scale alternative sanctions
(Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands), restorative justice (Northern Ireland) and preventive
and diversionary measures (Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK).
... [The second cluster] is perhaps best represented by the German approach ofjuveniles and
young adults, but one sees a similar approach in many continental European states. Western
European states, such as France and Belgium also have a strong welfare legal tradition,
although there are pressures to change this and create a more retributive system ....
However, this approach is also characteristic for other continental countries, such as
Switzerland, Spain, and Greece, as well as the Eastern European states.
Id. at 527-28.
15. Id. at 528 (this is traced particularly in Sweden, out of the three Scandinavian states, but there
are also some "just desert" innovations in Denmark, for example).
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place more emphasis on the offence, on the responsibility of the juveniles for their
actions, and on the proportionality principle.16
In addition to state-policy rules, juvenile justice is also governed by
international law. Three fundamental international conventions and several other
non-obligatory instruments regulate juvenile justice systems under international
law. The ICCPR guarantees general rights of suspects and accused, such as the
rights to avoid arbitrary detention,17 to be treated "with humanity and with respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person,"" and to "be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."' 9 It also refers specifically to minors' rights by requiring states to provide
every child "such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor"20
and demanding specifically that "[a]ccused juvenile persons shall be separated
from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication."21 In addition,
the ICCPR outlaws capital punishment for those under the age of eighteen. 22 The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 23 "provides for the due process of law, fairness in trial proceedings, a
right to education, a right to privacy and declares that any deprivation of liberty
(including curfews, electronic monitoring and community supervision) should not
be arbitrary or consist of any degrading treatment." 24
Yet, the most comprehensive convention regarding juvenile justice is the
CRC, which established a near global consensus that "[i]n all actions concerning
children . . . the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." 25 In
addition, it was established that all children have a right to protection,26 to
29
participation,27 to personal development, 28 and to basic material provisions. The
CRC upholds the following rights for children: "[T]o life, to be protected in armed
conflicts, to be safe-guarded from degrading and cruel punishment, to receive
special treatment in justice systems," and to be granted "freedom from
discrimination, exploitation, and abuse." 30 This "full-fledged Convention, which
has increasing importance for Youth protection as well as for Youth Justice ...

16. Id.
17. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 9(1).
18. Id. art. 10(1).
19. Id. art. 14(1).
20. Id. art. 24(1).
21. Id. art. 10(2)(b).
22. Id. art. 6(5).
23. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
24. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211.
25. CRC, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
26. Id. art. 3(2).
27. Cf id. arts. 12, 14-15 (discussing a child's freedom of expression, religion, conscience,
thought, association, and peaceful assembly).
28. Id. art. 6(2).
29. Id. arts. 23-27.
30. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211.
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was adopted in 1989 by the General Assembly and since than has been ratified by
191 countries." 3'
Articles 37, 39, and 40 of the CRC are relevant for juvenile justice. In Article
40, the CRC defines the purposes of juvenile justice to be "promoting the child's
reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society." 32 Hence,
Article 40 requires that:
Whenever appropriate . . . [the state shall use] measures for dealing

with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing
that human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected . . . [and shall

maintain] [a] variety of dispositions, such as care,
supervision orders; counseling; probation; foster care;
vocational training programmes and other alternatives
care .... 33
To that end, the CRC requires that a child will be

guidance and
education and
to institutional
"treated in a manner

consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth . . . which

takes into account the child's age" and "the needs of persons of his or her age"; 34
that detention shall be "used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time";35 that state parties "shall seek to promote the
establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically
applicable to children";36 and that the child "shall have the right to maintain
contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in
exceptional circumstances." 37
The above basic tenets of juvenile justice are reinforced by several nonbinding documents regarding juvenile justice. The United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice stress the need for
special training for the authorities regulating juvenile justice and determine "a
minimum training in law, sociology, psychology, criminology and behavioural
sciences." 38 The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
their Liberty elaborate on the conditions of detention of minors and reiterate the
importance of rehabilitation and return to community. 39 The United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency add that youth justice
31. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 526. See also Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211 ("The
only UN member states that have not ratified are Somalia and the USA (Somalia has had no
internationally recognised government since 1991, the US has claimed that ratification would
undermine parental rights."). South Sudan, since becoming a state in 2011, has also not ratified the
CRC. The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Signatory States and Parties to the Convention,
HUMANIUM, http://www.humanium.org/en/convention/signatory-states (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
32. CRC, supra note 1, art. 40(1).
33. Id. arts. 40(3)-(4).
34. Id. arts. 37(c), 40(1).
35. Id. art. 37(b).
36. Id. art. 40(3).
37. Id. art. 37(c).
38. G.A. Res. 40/33, Annex, at 211, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) (commenting on
Article 22).
39. G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, %79-80, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990).
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policy should avoid criminalizing children for minor misdemeanours. 4 0 Lastly, the
United Nations Children's Fund Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated
with Armed Forces or Armed Groups ("Paris Principles") deal specifically with
children recruited for armed forces during armed conflicts. 4 1 These principles
relate to the mechanism of juvenile justice under these special circumstances and
subject them to a "child rights approach" (including the principles of restorative
justice and reintegration) and the general principle of the best interests of the
child42 (which is also one of the foundations of the CRC). 43 The Paris Principles
also introduce the concept that children who are accused of committing war crimes
should be regarded not only as perpetrators but also as victims and treated
accordingly.44
Collectively, these conventions and rules might be viewed as tantamount to a
growing legal global standardization of juvenile justice. Numerous countries
"have now used the []CRC to improve protections for children and have appointed
special commissioners or ombudspersons to champion children's rights."A "A
monitoring body-the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child-reports under
the Convention and presses governments for reform."46
However, the enforcement of children's rights under international law is
complicated by the same problems faced by other human rights protected by
international human rights law. While the discussion and analysis of these
difficulties is beyond the scope of this paper, we note here that the mechanisms of
enforcing these laws are relatively weak.4 7 The implementation of such rights,
40. G.A. Res. 45/112, Annex, 56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/112 (Dec. 14, 1990).
41. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN FOUND., THE PARIS PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
ON CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES OR ARMED GROUPS 4 (2007) [hereinafter PARIS

PRINCIPLES], availableat http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/ParisPrinciplesEN.pdf.
42. Id. at 8-9.
43. CRC, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
44. PARIS PRINCIPLES, supra note 41, at 9. For the claim that the special circumstances of children
in terrorist groups may turn them from perpetrators into victims, see also Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen,
Child Terrorists: Why and How Should They be Protected by International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 262, 264-72 (Noalle Quenivet &
Shilan Shah-Davis eds., 2010).
45. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211. The appointment of ombudspersons for children
has become so prevalent in Europe that in 1997 a European Network for Ombudspersons for Children
was established to connect the independent offices for children in thirty-three countries in Europe. See
European Network of Ombudspersons for Children, CHILD RIGHTS INT'L NETWORK,
http://www.crin.org/enoc (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
46. Muncie & Goldson, supranote 13, at 211.
47. Most human rights law treaties are monitored by monitoring committees whose enforcing
authorities are rather limited. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 8-10 (4th ed. 2013).

They are usually authorized only to make recommendations for the implementation of their respective
instruments, while their authority to resolve disputes between states or between individuals and states
with regard to the application of the instruments depends on whether the states parties have accepted
such authority. See id. See also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to
the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by
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therefore, relies primarily on the good will of the states formally bound by human
rights treaties and customary law. 48 In addition, the CRC is not enforced by an
international tribunal, but it is rather a committee that monitors its implementation
by state parties and this committee is only authorized to "make suggestions and
general recommendations . . . [that] shall be transmitted to any State Party

concerned and reported to the General Assembly, together with comments, if any,
from States Parties." 49 Breaches attract no formal sanction, even though every five
years the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child tests the measures taken by
individual states to implement the convention.50 Moreover, non-governmental
organizations that critically review juvenile justice proceedings,5 ' such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, suggest that "implementation has often
been half-hearted and piecemeal." 52 A country will give lip service to rights in
order to be "granted status as a 'modem developed state' and acceptance into
world monetary systems." 53 The pressure to ratify is both moral and economic.
While the CRC may be the most ratified of all international human rights
directives, it is also the most violated. 54 Indeed, thirty-three countries' ratification

that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant."); Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 29(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 ("Any dispute
between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present
Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. [if this is not successful] . . . any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice .... ). However, states often sign human rights treaties with reservations.
See Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights
Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 277, 277 (1999). In addition, there is no international body that is
authorized to make mandatory decisions or to enforce human rights law instruments, except for the
U.N. Security Council, which may decide on matters pertaining to human rights law but only as far as
these issues are related to the Council's main objective, which is safeguarding international peace and
security. See DONNELLY, at 87, 162. The Security Council has taken action in response to different
human rights violations to different degrees of success. See id. at 90-91, 194-95, 198-99, 206-07
(including embargoes against South Africa in response to Apartheid, creating the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in reaction to violence in the Balkans, sending peacekeepers to
Rwanda to enforce the Arusha Accords, and ordering the International Criminal Court to indict Omar
al-Bashir for his responsibility for the humanitarian crisis in Darfur).
48. See DONNELLY, supra note 47, at 8.

49. CRC, supra note 1, art. 45(d).
50. Id. arts. 44-45.
51. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 526.
52. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211.
53. Id.
54. According to "Abramson's (2000) analysis of UN observations on the implementation of
juvenile justice in 141 countries" there is a "widespread lack of 'sympathetic understanding' necessary
for compliance with the []CRC." Id. at 212. ("[Abramson] notes that a complete overhaul of juvenile
justice is required in [twenty-one] countries and that in others torture, inhumane treatment, lack of
separation from adults, police brutality, bad conditions in detention facilities, overcrowding, lack of
rehabilitation, failure to develop alternatives to incarceration, inadequate contact between minors and
their families, lack of training of judges, police, and prison authorities, lack of speedy trial, no legal
assistance, disproportionate sentences, insufficient respect for the rule of law and improper use of the
juvenile justice system to tackle other social problems, are of common occurrence.").
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is accompanied by reservations.55 "For example the Netherlands, Canada, and the
UK have issued reservations to the requirement to separate children from adults in
detention."56
Above all, like other human rights law treaties and instruments, the ICCPR
and the CRC are general in their character and lack specific detailed regulations for
the legal procedures of juvenile justice; among them, regulations of criminal
procedures, specific forms of rehabilitation, and limitation periods for offences
committed by juveniles. Hence, it is understood that the importance of the CRC
and other soft law instruments lies more in the values they represent and their
moral appeal to realize these values, and less in their actual application.
Even more complicated, however, is the question of which human rights
norms governing juvenile justice systems in independent and democratic regimes
could, and should, be applied within occupation regimes. As we shall see in the
following section, both the problem and its suggested solutions emerge from the
question of which legal regimes should apply in occupied territories.
III.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE LAW OF OCCUPATION

Traditional, or classic, international law of occupation sets a very constrained
framework of rules to govern belligerent occupation regimes, known as belligerent
occupation law or international humanitarian law. 57 However, the last decades
have witnessed a proliferation of other types of occupation regimes. These include
long-term occupation regimes (for example, in the territories administered by
Israel) and transformative occupation regimes, also called multilateral regimes (in
formerly occupied Iraq and in Afghanistan)." The aim of these latter regimes is to
build new societies as end goals of intervention and to protect the occupied
population as consistent with international norms and human rights law, and they
are characterized by the involvement of the U.N.5 9
The changing nature of occupation regimes-in terms of both the period of
the occupation and the goals of the regime-will, in our view, inevitably change
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 237, 270-73 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
58. See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and
Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 584, 588-89, 604-05 (2006). A recent report on occupation and
other forms of administration of foreign territory prepared by the International Committee of the Red
Cross questions the legal basis of transformative occupations and suggest that their mandate relies only
in U.N. Security Council decisions and not in international law itself. See TRISTAN FERRARO, INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION

TERRITORY

67-71

(2012)

[hereinafter

ICRC

REPORT],

OF FOREIGN

available

at

http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf. However, in this article we rather
accept the main existence of such forms of occupations (or administration of territory) and hence
delineate the duties incumbent on such regimes without questioning their legitimacy under international
law.
59. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 7-9, 13
(2006) (see figure 1).
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the normative legal framework that regulates those regimes and the interpretation
of existing traditional laws. In order to enable them to fulfill their purposes, both
long-term occupation regimes and transformative (even if short-term) occupation
regimes demand changes in the set of rules that govern them. For example, since
the aim of transformative regimes is to rebuild the legal infrastructure of the
territory they occupy and create a new legal order, the governing laws must allow
changes in the existing laws in the occupied territory. Long-term occupation
regimes, on the other hand, may not require permission to change existing laws in
the occupied area, but they must consider the need for development of the
occupied area. In this section, we compare the traditional and the new obligations
of occupiers in the administered territories (as long-term occupiers) and in
formerly occupied Iraq (as transformative occupiers).
The foundations of the traditional law of occupation are the 1907 fourth
Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention.6 1 These instruments,
which are considered customary international law, 62 establish the framework of
belligerent occupations regimes: that is, their goals, the duties of the occupant, and
the rights and privileges of the occupied population. They also seek to create a
harmonized system that secures the rights of the occupied population, on the one
hand, and the security needs of the occupant, on the other hand.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations contains the crux of the goals of the
occupation regime and the obligations of the occupant:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power
to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.63
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention completes the legal framework
that enables the occupying power to ensure "public order and safety": "The penal
laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they
may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they
constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present
Convention."64 As one commentator noted, "[t]he main thrust of the international
law of occupation is to provide a set of interstitial rules for the administration of
territory during an interim period while the fate of the territory is decided." 65
However, questions arise with regard to the content, the purpose, and the
limits of the framework of these rules, especially, as will be discussed further, visA-vis the changes that conservative forms of belligerent occupations have

60. Hague Regulations, supra note 7.
61. GCIV, supra note 2.
62. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
(July 8).
63. Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
64. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 64.
65. Harris, supra note 59, at 8.

1

79
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undergone. A recent report prepared by legal experts on behalf of the International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), aimed at analyzing, clarifying, and
developing the laws of occupation, suggested that the obligation to "'restore and
ensure public order and safety' contained in the first part of Article 43 of [the
Hague Regulations]" would receive a much broader interpretation in terms of the
obligations of the occupying power if interpreted according to the authoritative
French text, as this version "referred to the restoration and maintenance of 'l'ordre
et la vie publics,"' that is the restoration of "public order and civil lie.",66 In this
interpretation, the occupying power's obligations according to the Hague
Regulations "to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety"
represent a role that is fraught rather than one-dimensional.67 The occupying
power, in this reading, would "no longer be regarded as . . . a disinterested invader
but rather . .. a full-fledged administrator."6 8

The above obligations to restore and maintain public order and safety in the
occupied territory are realized and performed by the military commander, the
incarnation of effective control in the occupied territory. This position has been
echoed by the Israeli Supreme Court in several cases:
As is well known, Article 43 [of the Hague Regulations is a] ...
framework maxim of the belligerent occupation laws, which sets a
general framework for the manner by which the military commander
exercises its duties and powers in the occupied territory. . . . [T]he

commander of the Area must exercise his powers under all
circumstances exclusively for the benefit of the Area, while applying
only the relevant considerations-the best interest of the protected
persons, on the one hand, and the needs of the military, on the other
hand.69

Thus, when exercising his powers, "the military commander is not allowed to
consider the national, economic and social interests of his own state, inasmuch as
such interests have no effect on his security interest in the area or the interest of the
70
local population."
However, the ICRC report on occupation suggests that prolonged occupation
"call[s] into question some of the underlying principles of occupation law, in
particular the provisional character of the occupation and the necessity of
preserving the status quo ante." 71

Hence, it asserts "[s]ince neither the Hague

Regulations nor the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies any lawful deviation from
existing law in such circumstances, many have argued that prolonged occupation
necessitates specific regulations for guiding responses to the practical problems
66. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 56-57 (first emphasis added).
67. Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
68. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 57.
69. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights v. Commander of the IDF Forces in
the West Bank } 8 [2011 ] (Isr.).
70. Id. (quoting HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area 37(4) PD 785,
794-795 [1983] (Isr.)).
71. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 55.
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arising from long-term occupation." 72 Indeed, the prolonged nature of the Israeli
occupation in the administered territories has generated numerous discussions over
the years on the question of how the commander should apply the relevant
considerations and exercise his duties. The main question discussed by the Israeli
Supreme Court has been how to adjust "the prolonged duration of the occupation,
to the continuity of normal life in the Area and to the sustainability of .. . relations
between the two authorities-the occupier and the occupied." 73
These discussions have mainly taken place in the context of securing the
rights and freedoms of the occupied population, such as the freedom of
movement, 74 the right to property,75 or the rights of the civilian population in times
of armed conflict.76 These discussions have persisted both when the territories
were peacefully administered and when uprisings and even armed conflicts arose. 77
The Israeli Supreme Court concluded by stating the need for a dynamic view
of the duties of the military commander:
This kind of conception supports the adoption of a wide and dynamic
view of the duties of the military commander in the [administered
territories], which impose upon him, inter alia, the responsibility to
ensure the development and growth of the Area in numerous and
various fields, including the fields of economic infrastructure and its
development.78

The Supreme Court then quoted a previous ruling: "Thus, a military
administration may develop industry, commerce, agriculture, education, health,

welfare and other elements regarding good governance, which are required in order
to secure the changing needs of a population in an area held in belligerent

72. Id.
73. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din, 10 (citing HCJ 393/82 Askaan at 800-02; HCJ 9717/03 Naale v.
Civil Administration 58(6) PD 97, 103-04 [2004] (Isr.); HCJ 337/71 El-Jamiya v. Minister of Defense
26(1) PD 547, 582 [1972] (Isr.)).
74. HCJ 2150/07 Safiyeh et al. v. Minister of Defense
32 [2009] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/07/500/021/ml9/07021500.ml9.pdf.
75. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel 48(5) PD 807, 8 [2004] (Isr.), available
at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf; see also HCJ 7957/04
Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, T 7 [2005] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/Files ENG/04/570/079/Al4/04079570.Al4.HTM.
76. See, e.g., HCJ 9132/07 Albassioni v. Prime Minister % 4-5, 7, 10-11 [2008] (Isr.) (not
reported), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/07/320/091/n25/07091320.n25.pdf; see
also HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister 1 1 [2009] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/09/010/002/nO7/09002010.nO7.pdf.
77. See, e.g., HCJ 201/09 Physiciansfor Human Rights 1, 3-4 (discussing IDF activities in Cast
Lead operation in 2009); HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 85(5)
PD
385,
1,
3
[2004]
(Isr.),
available
at
http://elyon I.court.gov.il/fileseng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.a03.pdf
(reviewing
applications
regarding IDF activities in defense operations); HCJ 2936/02 Physicians for Human Rights v.
Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank 53(3) PD 26 [2002] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/360/029/LO2/02029360.102.pdf.
78. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din 10 (first emphasis added).
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occupation." 79 The Israeli Court seems to express a view that is compatible with
the authoritative French text of the Hague Regulations. According to this view, the
lengthy nature of the Israeli occupation in the administered territories requires that
the discretion of the military commander be widened to take into consideration the
needs of the restoration and maintenance of the general civil life, as it is his
responsibility "to ensure the development and growth of the Area in numerous and
various fields."80 In fact, this view supports the concept that the fundamental
conservative rules of occupation law should not be interpreted as a general
directive to freeze development in occupied territory or leading the territory into a
frozen situation."
Yet, it should be clarified that this widened authorization cannot exceed the
constraints of the international law of occupation-that is, the Hague Regulations
and the Fourth Geneva Convention-which sustain that the interests of the
protected persons (the local population living in the occupied territories) must be
secured.82 Therefore, the military commander's discretion may be widened in the
administered territories given the prolonged nature of the occupation regime so
long as this is done for the benefit of the occupied population: that is, for the
protected persons.83
The military commander's discretion is also restricted with regard to the
occupying power's ability to legislate in the occupied territory. Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations orders the occupying power to respect, "unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country." 84 Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention authorizes the occupying power (and hence the military commander)
to:
[S]ubject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which
are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations
under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the
territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the
members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and
likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by
them. 85

This indicates that the occupying power should not engage in attempts to
change the fundamental legal framework-that is, the legislation and institutions
of the occupied territory-as it is not the permanent sovereign of the territory. As

the ICRC report suggests, we must interpret the concept of the necessity to change
laws governing the occupied territory folded within Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations as encompassing, first, the duty of the occupant to fulfill its
79. Id. (quoting HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area 37(4) PD 785,
804 [1983] (Isr.)).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 72.
82. See HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din 1 8.
83. Id. 10.
84. Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
85. GCIV, supranote 2, art. 64.
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obligations under Fourth Geneva Convention; second, to maintain orderly
government in the occupied territory; and third, preserve its ability to ensure its
own security.86 This is the only justification for the occupying power to change the
pre-existing legal system in the occupied territory and issue its own military
legislation.
With regard to the role of the occupying power emerging from both the
Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, then, we can conclude that,
on the one hand, it exceeds the conservative framework of a short-term belligerent
occupation regime. The occupying power may "develop industry, commerce,
agriculture, education, health, welfare and other elements regarding good
governance, which are required in order to secure the changing needs of a
population in an area held in belligerent occupation."88 On the other hand, the role
of occupying power does not evolve into that of a complete sovereign that can
legitimately and indiscriminately change the laws in the area.
In contrast, in formerly occupied Iraq, a broader mandate in terms of the
development of the physical and legal infrastructures of the occupied territory was
given to members of the Coalition (mainly the United States and the United
Kingdom).89 Following the invasion of Iraq, the United States established the
transitional government of the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") on behalf
of the Coalition.98 The U.N. Security Council gave the Coalition members a
mandate to administer Iraq,91 allowing them to
advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for
representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a
process leading to an internationally recognized, representative
government of Iraq; . . . [to] promot[e] the protection of human rights; ..

. [and to] encourag[e] international efforts to promote legal and judicial
reform. 92
However, while the Security Council referred to the administration of the

Coalition members in Iraq as occupation, 93 the CPA did not refer to the
administrative regime it created as "an occupation regime," but rather as a

86. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 56-59.
87. Id. (the experts base their interpretation of the concept of necessity in article 43 of the Hague
Regulations).
88. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights v. Commander of the IDF Forces in
the West Bank 10 [2011] (Isr.) (quoting HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the
Area 37(4) PD 785, 804 [1983] (Isr.)).
89. See S.C Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
90. Sean D. Murphy, Ed., Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During Occupation of
Iraq, 98 AM. J.INT'L L. 601, 601-02 (2004).
91. See S.C. Res. 1546, 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1511,
13-14,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, 4.
92. S.C. Res. 1483, supranote 89, 8.
93. See id. pmbl. (referring to the Coalition members as "occupying powers").
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"transitional administration"94 regime that intended to "restore conditions of
security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely
determine their own political future, (including by advancing efforts to restore and
establish national and local institutions for representative governance) and
facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development." 95
The objectives of the powers in Iraq, accompanied by the involvement of the
U.N. Special Representative to Iraq in helping the Iraqi people and members of the
Coalition achieve these goals, suggest that "the purposes of the occupation [there] .
. . went beyond the confines of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention," 96 even though not to such an extent that they completely disregarded
the traditional law of occupation. Hence, the mandate to reform the existing legal
framework in Iraq gained by the CPA and the U.N. Security Council was much
wider than that given to the Israeli occupying power in the administered
territories.97
The differences between the administered territories and formerly occupied
Iraq in the objectives and roles of the occupying powers suggest a difference in the
application and interpretation of the legal framework governing these occupied
territories, be it the traditional law of occupation, which forms part of international
humanitarian law,98 or international human rights law, which, as will be discussed
in the next section, contemporary legal theory of international law claims to apply
in occupied territories. We will discuss this difference in the following section.
IV.

THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The co-application of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law has become a prominent topic of discussion in the last decade,
yielding controversies and disagreements over both its mere feasibility and its form
or degree. 99 In this section, we examine this co-application specifically through
94. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
(CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES 8 (2004) (statement for Maj.
Frank A. March).

95. Id. at I (footnote omitted).
96. Roberts, supra note 58, at 613.
97. Yet, it is interesting to note that after the conclusion of the formal mandate of the Coalition
and since the insurgents' activities in Iraq demanded the continuing presence of Coalition forces, the
administrative regime regained its nature as a traditional form of belligerent occupation, which required
the application of traditional Hague and Geneva law. See id. 617-18.
98. International humanitarian law includes both the laws of belligerent occupation and the laws
governing the conduct of hostilities. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 7.
99. There are numerous articles on this issue. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Oma Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (containing nine essays on the

relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law); Michael J.
Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and
Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005); Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between
InternationalHumanitarianLaw and InternationalHuman Rights Law in Situations ofArmed Conflict,
40 ISR. L. REV. 310 (2007); Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law
Protection and InternationalHumanitarian Law, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 789 (2004); Orna Ben-
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the prism of norms that apply in the juvenile justice system in occupied territories.
We then apply the discussion to the case study of the juvenile justice system in
former occupied Iraq.
A.

The Mutual Application ofInternationalHuman Rights Law and
InternationalHumanitarianLaw

It has been long contested whether human rights law should apply in
situations where international humanitarian law traditionally applies, including
occupied territories.00 Some valuable arguments apply against such application,
the most significant being that protections provided by international human rights
treaties do not normally apply extra-territorially, outside the government-governed
relationship.o' This position is extrapolated from a narrow linguistic interpretation
of the "under its jurisdiction" clause of the ICCPR.102 Others argue that because
human rights norms were not drawn up with the circumstances of armed conflict
and occupation primarily in mind, the rules of the law of armed conflict regarding
military occupations offer more extensive, detailed, and relevant guidance on a
wide range of issues than do the general human rights conventions.10 3 These two
regimes, therefore, are said to mutually exclude each other.104 Another argument is
that "human rights treaty bodies [are not necessarily] competent to find violations
of international humanitarian law, or even to evaluate conduct during armed
conflicts or military occupation, when the treaties that created these bodies gave
them a mandate only to review generally state implementation of obligations under
each instrument." 05
However, contemporary theories of international law and practice do support
such co-application. 06 This can be seen, on the one hand, through a direct and

Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living In Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories,37 ISR. L. REV. 17 (2003).
100. See Dennis, supra note 99, at 119-20 (referencing the observation of Jean Pictet, editor of the
ICRC commentaries, on the 1949 Geneva Convention).
101. See id. at 122-27.
102. Id. at 122-23.
103. E.g., Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 28.
104. Id. at 29; Roberts, supra note 58, at 600.
105. Dennis, supra note 99, at 121-22.
106. For two of ICJ's core decisions on this subject, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J. 226, 1 25 (July 8) and Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, IT
106-113 (July 9) (this case included examining Israel's obligations under the ICCPR in the occupied
territories). For recent European Court of Human Rights decisions that support the mutual application
of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, see Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom,
App.
No.
27021/08
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.,
July
7,
2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612 (this and the next case examine the
United Kingdom's obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights in their role in the
occupation of Iraq); Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 07, 2011),
http:/ihudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-105606; Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96
(Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 3, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67460 (this
and the next case cases examine Turkey's obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights
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independent application of human rights law in occupied territories according to a
contemporary interpretation of the obligations entrusted with the occupying power
by traditional occupation law (such as Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention),10 7 or, on the other hand, by applying
According to this latter approach, international
a lex specialis concept.0
humanitarian law is the lex specialis in occupation regimes, and hence
international human rights law serves as a complementary set of norms that should
be applied as an interpretative source of the former, serving to solve lacunas in
international humanitarian law and validate the legitimacy of the involvement of
international supervisory mechanisms in situations of occupation.109 This coapplication of human rights law and international humanitarian law is based on a
paradigm that undermines the traditional great divide between the law of war and
the law of peace. It is vested in the idea of universality of human rights that
embraces "the interpretation of the jurisdictional clauses of the major human rights
treaties, substitut[es] the test of effective control for the concept of territory, and
revers[es] the presumption in favor of the territorial application of international
treaties, insofar as human right treaties are concerned."' to
Yet, while the above analysis of the co-application of international
humanitarian law and human rights law may seem plausible where the occupying
power executes law enforcement actions, its feasibility with regard to situations of
armed conflict in an occupied territory requires further substantiation. Indeed, this
is quite often the situation that occupying powers face even after establishing a
stable occupation regime."' As the ICRC report on occupation suggests:
[O]ccupation law is silent on the separation and interaction between law
enforcement measures and the use of military force under the 'conductof-hostilities' model . . . [and hence, it] leaves unresolved a number of

in regards to Turkish soldiers in Iraq); Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1751; Loizidou v. Turkey,
310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (this case examines Turkey's obligations under the European
Convention of Human Rights in regards to its actions in the 1974 Cyprus invasion and the refugees that
resulted). For the U.N. position on the universal application of minimum humanitarian standards, see
Comm. on Human Rights, Letter Dated 5 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Norway
and the Charg6 d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Finland Addressed to the Commission on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/116 (Jan. 31, 1995) (notifying that the U.N. Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities decided to transmit the Declaration of
Minimum Humanitarian Standards).
107. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 64; Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43. See also Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 1 178 (Dec.
19).
108. See the cases cited in note 106.
109. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 61-66. See also Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 22.
110. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 100.
111. This was the case between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza before the disengagement, and
partially the case in the administered territories. See id. at 19. A similar situation prevailed in formerly
occupied Iraq, where continuing insurgent activities have been pitted against the Coalition forces. See,
e.g., Seumas Milne, Insurgents Form PoliticalFront to Planfor US Pullout, GUARDIAN, July 18, 2007,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/I9/topstories3.usa.
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issues related to the identification of the legal regime(s) governing the
use of force in occupied territory.112

The inability to identify the legal regimes that should govern the use of force
in occupied territory pertains to a difficulty in determining whether human rights
law regimes should apply even to law enforcement missions that the occupying
power is to execute under the constraints of an armed conflict, such as detentions,
assigning of residence, or issuing of orders that limit movement in the occupied
territory.
In scenarios where hostilities arise in the occupied territory, the occupying
power may lose, at least to some degree, its effective control. Since the level of
effective control needed to apply human rights law is greater than that needed to
apply the laws governing the conduct of hostilities, the occupying power may
conclude that the latter should prevail over the former." 3 Some have suggested
that situations where armed conflict arises infrequently in occupied territories be
defined as a mixed conflict,' 14 comprising periods where "protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized groups" take place and
other periods where the occupying power exercises effective control in relatively
peaceful circumstances." 5 According to a mixed conflict model, the coapplication of human rights law and international humanitarian law is also
intelligible, as the occupying power's capacity to exercise some degree of effective
control implies its capacity to enforce human rights law in the area." 6
These assertions regarding the applicability of human rights law in occupied
territories are strengthened by the nature of long-term and transformative
occupations, discussed above." 7 "[A]n occupant with a transformative project
may view human rights norms as constituting part of the beneficent political order
being introduced into the territory."" t A long-term occupant will perhaps be
112. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 109.
113. See HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 85(5) PD 385,1
20 [2004] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.a03.pdf;
HCJ 3239/02 Mar'ab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank $ 21 [2002] (Isr.), available at
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2012/3720 eng.pdf; Yuval Shany, Israeli Counter-Terrorism Measures:
Are They "Kosher" Under International Law?, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 96, 105 (Int'l Inst. of Humanitarian Law ed., 2003), available at
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/Terrorism%/ 20and%/o201HL.pdf. See also Hilly Moodrick EvenKhen, Can We Now Tell What "Direct Participationin Hostilities" Is?, 40 ISR. L. REv. 214, 219-31
(2007); see also HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 16
[2006] (lsr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf
(citing Israeli Supreme Court's statements in cases dealing with the Israeli Army activities in the
territories during the second Intifada, that the laws of armed conflict should prevail in those territories).
I14. AMICHAI COHEN & YUVAL SHANY, 1

"

, r100f

nTn

n-'pn :127 nK 1lMpflan2

'n

[The IDF and Alleged International Law Violations: Reforming Policies for Self-Investigations] 26-27
(2011) (Isr.), available at http://en.idi.org.il/media/230988/pp_93.pdf.
115. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, $ 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
116. COHEN & SHANY, supra note 114, at 26-27.
117. See id.

118. Roberts, supra note 58, at 594.
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pressured by "the inhabitants, or outside bodies claiming to act on their behalf," to
apply standards that secure "the human rights of inhabitants, internees, and
others."' 19
Indeed, a long-term belligerent occupant may claim conservatively that
international humanitarian law adequately ensures the rights of the occupied
population.120 However, the prototype of belligerent occupations regime that set
the model for international humanitarian law, including the laws of belligerent
occupation, was of a short-term occupation. This legal framework, most of it
intended to expire a year after the commencement of an occupation,' 2 1 was
carefully tailored for the purposes of keeping law and order in the occupied
territory by imposing limited obligations on the occupant for the rights of the
occupied population and by providing the occupant with a confined set of means
for derogating from the protected rights of the occupied population.122 Long-term
occupations, which demand the "develop[ment of] industry, commerce,
agriculture, education, health, welfare and other elements regarding good
governance" are closer in resemblance to sovereign regimes.' 23 As the period of
occupation extends, they face demands of the civilian population to be protected
"from improper exercise of governmental power."' 24 The legal framework of
human rights law-rather than international humanitarian law-is thus most
adequate for fulfilling this mission. Human rights law norms and ideology, which
seek to ensure human dignity, are designed to insist that governments provide for
the needs of individuals. Hence, as the belligerent occupant exercises most of the
powers of the sovereign government-such as "the power to legislate (jurisdiction
to prescribe), the power to resolve disputes (jurisdiction to adjudicate), and the

19. Id. See, e.g., NAAMA BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, B'TSELEM, No MINOR MATTER: VIOLATIONS
OF THE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN MINORS ARRESTED BY ISRAEL ON SUSPICION OF STONE-THROWING 7-

9 (Yael Stein & Maya Johnston eds., Zvi Shulman trans., 2011), available at
http://www.btselem.org/download/201107_no-minor-matter eng.pdf (demanding that the Convention
on the Rights of the Child be applied by Israel in the occupied territories). For the U.N. Human Rights
Committee and the U.N. Economic, Cultural and Social Committee's demands to apply human rights
treaties in these territories, see Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 22d, 23d, and
24th Sess., Apr. 25-May 12, 2000, Aug. 14-Sept. 1, 2000, Nov. 13-Dec. 1, 2000, 1 577, U.N. Doc.
E/2001/22; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 2 (2001); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Second Periodic Report, Addendum: Israel, Human Rights
Comm., 1 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm.,
Considerations of Reports].
120. See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports, supra note 119, 8 (detailing Israel's
position objecting to the co-application of human rights law and international humanitarian law and
claiming that international humanitarian law adequately suffices for the administration of the occupied
territory).
121. GCIV, supranote 2, art. 6.
122. See, e.g., id. arts. 43, 53, 78 (allowing internment, expropriation of property, and assigned
residence respectively).
123. HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area 37(4) PD 785, 804 [1983]
(Isr.). See also Roberts, supra note 58, at 601 (indicating specific situations where human rights law
should apply).
124. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 61.
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power to implement laws and court decisions (jurisdiction to enforce)"l 25 -it
seems logical that the belligerent occupant apply, mutatis mutandis, the apparatus
of human rights law in the occupied territory.
The above conclusion connects the argument put forward in this article
(namely, that the occupying power's compliance with the obligation to restore and
maintain public order and civil life requires certain transformations) to the
argument that these transformations are best achieved by the application of human
rights law. However, the following questions arise: Does the applicability of
human rights law depend only on the occupying power's objectives and
obligations in the occupied territory? Or should it also be affected by the
willingness of the ousted sovereign's constitutional regime to absorb and apply
international human rights law or by the values and goals of the occupied
population, if these can be detected? The answer is not immediately clear. It may
be argued that the flexibility given to an occupying power "to implement human
rights law in occupied territory .

.

. should not be interpreted as giving it a blank

cheque to change legislation and institutions in the name of human rights to make
them accord with its own legal and institutional ideas."I 26
Yet, an alternative claim points to the dicta of the International Court of
Justice that accepts the applicability of human rights law in occupied territory both
as a complementary set of norms and as a direct interpretation and application of
belligerent occupation law, 1 27 and the universality of human rights law and the
customary nature of most of its norms. Accordingly, proponents of this view
demand the application of human rights law in the occupied territory by the
occupying power, and even justify the use of it to make substantial changes in the
occupied territory. 128
Finally, the endorsement of the application of human rights law in occupied
territories serves perfectly the interests of securing a legitimate juvenile justice
system discussed in the second section of this article. The principal aims of a
juvenile justice system-that is "[t]o prevent offending and re-offending; [t]o
(re)socialize and (re)integrate offenders; [and] [t]o address the needs and interests
of victims" through diminished responsibility, proportionality, and room to
reform 29 -are all incorporated both in general human rights instruments and in
those specific to children's rights, as was suggested and exemplified above.
In addition, as maintained in this section, international human rights law
supplies both the long-term belligerent occupant and the transformative occupant
with an additional compatible legal framework to abide by its obligations towards
125. Id. at 60-61.
126. ICRC REPORT, supranote 58, at 69.
127. See generally the cases in note 106.
128. See, e.g., ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 70 (noting that "Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention require the suspension or abrogation of
oppressive local laws if they hindered the occupying power from discharging its duties under the Fourth
Geneva Convention and by extension of this principle, require the occupying power to implement any
other obligations derived from international law, in particular human rights law").
129. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 510-11.
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the protected persons in the occupied territory. Therefore, in order to ensure a
legitimate juvenile justice system within the occupied territory, the occupying
power should be bound both by general human rights law norms and by specific
human rights standards that regulate the treatment of children under human rights
law.
Having determined the above, we must decide which instruments of
international human rights law that substantiate those norms and standards bind the
occupying power. As states are bound by their customary and treaty international
law obligations, systems of juvenile justice that are established by sovereign states
rest, inter alia, on general human rights principles such as the prevention of such
practices as torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
and prolonged arbitrary detention, considered as customary law,1 30 and, secondly,
on the rights that are specifically mentioned in the ICCPR regulating standards of
legal detention, arrest, and trial for those states that are parties to the
Convention.' 3 ' A system of juvenile justice is also compiled of rights and
protections specifically tailored to secure the rights of children who are detained,
arrested, or tried. These are found in the CRC and in non-binding instruments,
such as decisions of U.N. bodies and ICRC documents.
An examination of the applicability of human rights treaty law reveals that a
wide interpretation of the "under its jurisdiction" clause of the ICCPR suggests that
an occupier has jurisdiction over persons who are under its effective control, 32
which applies when it exercises public powers on the territory of another state.133
This leads to the conclusion that the ICCPR applies in occupied territories.
However, the case for application of the CRC is more complicated. This
convention contains an application clause that determines that "States Parties shall
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the . . . Convention to each child within
theirjurisdiction,"l34 and hence has been interpreted by the International Court of

Justice to impose a similar obligation on occupying powers to apply this
convention in the territory they temporarily administer.' 35 However, it may be

130. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (7th ed. 2008); MALCOLM
N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-57 (5th ed. 2003).

131. ICCPR, supranote 4, arts. 9, 10, 14.
132. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136, if 108-11 (July 9).
133. See, e.g., AI-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 11 107-10 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 7,
2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612; Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom,
App. No.
55721/07,
131-42
(Eur.
Ct. H.R.,
July 07, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105606
(noting examples of recent
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the court, in contrast to its former dicta that
aimed at limiting the application of the European Convention on Human Rights extraterritorially, ruled
that the Convention applied when a state-such as an occupying power-is responsible for maintaining
the security of the territory that is under its effective control or when it has the authority to employ
governmental authorities); contra infra Part V.A (explaining Israel's contrasting position on this issue).
134. CRC, supra note 1, art. 2 (emphasis added).
135. Legal Consequences ofthe Constructionofa Wall in the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J.
113 ("As regards the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, that
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contended that this convention does not apply in armed conflicts. The specific
reference of Article 38 of the CRC to situations of armed conflicts specifies that
states "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international
humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the
child" and "[i]n accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian
law to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts." 36 This may suggest that
the CRC intended to exclude other of its articles in times of armed conflict and
occupation.' 37 Yet, other non-binding human rights standards referring to juvenile
justice
can be considered as guiding the occupying power regime in the
occupied territory, as a manifestation of the general application of human rights
law in these territories.
Hence, the specific human rights law norms that apply in occupied territories
are primarily those in the ICCPR that determine the rights of suspects and accused,
guaranteeing the right to avoid arbitrary detention,' 39 to be treated "with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person," 40 and "to a fair and
public hearing by a[n] . . . independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."' 41 As was indicated in the second section of this article, specific reference to

minors' rights is also found within the ICCPR when it requires states to provide
every child "such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor"l42 and demands specifically that "[a]ccused juvenile persons shall be
separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication." l43
The CRC-whose applicability in occupied territories, while questionable, is
possible-focuses on the importance of securing juvenile justice and adds more
obligations for states parties. 144
These include seeking "to promote the
establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically
applicable to children [in the juvenile justice system]," 4 5 demanding that detention
"shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate
period of time," 46 and that the child "shall have the right to maintain contact with
his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional
circumstances."' 47 These goals are reinforced by the soft law instruments that refer

instrument contains an Article 2 according to which 'States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights
set forth in the . . . Convention to each child within their jurisdiction . . . .' That Convention is therefore
applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territory.").
136. CRC, supranote 1, arts. 38(1), 38(4).
137. Dennis, supra note 99, at 129.
138. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
139. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 9.
140. Id. art. 10(1).
141. Id. art. 14(1).
142. Id. art. 24(1).
143. Id. art. 10(2)(b).
144. See Dennis, supra note 99, at 129.
145. CRC, supra note 1, art. 40(3).
146. Id. art. 37(b).
147. Id. art. 37(c).
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to the detention and rehabilitation of children in juvenile justice systems, which
were discussed in the second section of this article.
In the following sub-section we discuss the co-application of the laws of
belligerent occupation and human rights law in the juvenile justice system in
formerly occupied Iraq. We examine the standards of human rights law that were
formally incorporated into the legal instruments regulating the CPA and discuss
the question of whether the administration has lived up to its own standards.
B.

The Juvenile Justice System in Formerly OccupiedIraq

As explained above,14 8 the Coalition occupation regime in Iraq was approved
by the U.N. Security Council and implemented by the CPA memorandum.14 9
Those instruments, which approved and provided guidance to the Coalition's
occupation, based the regime's legal framework explicitly on the laws of
belligerent occupation and implicitly on human rights law. Security Council
Resolution 1483 instructed the Coalition forces to abide by and comply fully with
their obligations under the laws of belligerent occupation, "including in particular
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.""so The
CPA revised memorandum stipulated that "the relevant and appropriate provisions
[of the Fourth Geneva Convention] constitute an appropriate framework consistent
with its mandate in continuance of measures previously adopted."151
In terms of the application of human rights law, the CPA noted "the
deficiencies of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code with regard to fundamental
standards of human rights," 52 and intended to "establish[] procedures for applying
criminal law in Iraq, recognizing that the effective administration of justice must
consider . . . the need to modify aspects of Iraqi law that violate fundamental

standards of human rights."' 53
The Security Council addressed the application of human rights law only
indirectly by calling upon the Coalition members to act
consistent[ly] with the Charterof the United Nations and other relevant
internationallaw, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the
effective administration of the territory, including in particular working

towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the
creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine
54
their own political future.1

148. See supra Part III.
149. Memorandum of L. Paul Bremer, Adm'r, Multinational Provisional Auth., Coalition
Provisional Auth. Memorandum Number 3 (Revised) (June 27, 2004), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/469cdlb32.html [CPA Memo (Revised)].
150. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, 5.

151. CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, pmbl.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 1.
154. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, $ 4 (emphasis added).

142

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 42:2

Following the termination of the U.N. mandate for the occupation in Iraq
given to the Coalition in 2005, the occupation regime ended,' 55 and since the
departure of the multinational force from Iraq, the prevailing legal framework has
been a subject of debate.156 According to the United States, after the end of the
U.N. mandate, the occupation re-acquired its definition as a belligerent occupation
regime in which insurgent activities take place.' 57 Under such circumstances, the
lex specialis is humanitarian law, which is regulated by the Hague and Geneva
laws, which generally do not contain specific guarantees for the rights of children
detained by the occupying power. However, according to another legal analysis,
the completion of the U.N. mandate rendered the lex specialis in Iraq human rights
law, notwithstanding the armed conflict between dissident forces and the Coalition
powers that remained there.iss In this interpretation, belligerent occupation law
lost its relevancy.159
However, according to the analysis of this article, both international
humanitarian law and human rights law should have applied. International
humanitarian law, which includes both the laws of belligerent occupation and the
laws of armed conflict, is the lex specialis, and human rights law supplies
complementary standards of interpretation and resolves situations not satisfactorily
60
regulated by the laws of belligerent occupation or the laws of armed conflict.1
Juvenile justice seems to be such a situation, requiring co-application of these
laws.
The detention and prosecution of children both before the end of the U.N.
mandate and afterwards was governed by a legal framework that incorporated
general human rights standards only to a very limited extent. "The United StatesIraq status of forces agreement require[d] that juveniles detained by [United States
Forces in Iraq] be released, or, if sufficient evidence exist[ed], that they be
transferred to the Iraqi justice system for processing."' 6 ' The CPA referred to the
detention of children under the age of eighteen only, determining that any person
under the age of eighteen interned at any time shall in all cases be released not later
than twelve months after the initial date of internment.162 The CPA formally
related only to the basic ICCPR guarantees of the right to freedom 63 and due
155. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 91, 4(c).
156. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 617-18; cf US: Respect Rights of Child Detainees in Iraq:
Children in US Custody Held Without Due Process, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 20, 2008),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/05/19/us-respect-rights-child-detainees-iraq [hereinafter HRW Report].
157. See Roberts, supranote 58, at 608.
158. See id. at 594.
159. HRW Report, supranote 156.
160. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
106-113 (July 9); Legality of the Threat or Use of
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136,
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, T 25 (July 8).
161. U.N Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Children and
Armed Conflict, 100, U.N. Doc. A/65/820-S/2011/250 (Apr. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Report of SG on
Children in Armed Conflicts].
162. CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, § 6(5).
163. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 9.
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process of law,164 and completely disregarded specific juvenile justice norms under
international human rights law, such as taking into consideration the interest of
rehabilitation or emphasizing the best interest of the child. 6 1
Even more so in practice, not only have the juvenile justice standards been
ignored, but the general standards of human rights law have also been abused.
According to the report of the U.N. Secretary General to the Security Council in
April 2011, the detention of children by United States Forces in Iraq ("USF-l")
already ceased before the report was prepared: "As of June 2010, no juveniles
remained in USF-I custody."' 66
To date, the United States has not released statistics on the number of children
under the age of 18 it has transferred to Iraqi custody for trial. According to the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq by December 2007
89 children transferred from US to Iraqi custody had been convicted of
offenses .

. .

. Between December 2007 and March 2008, there was a

drop of 450 children in U.S. custody, but the United States has not made
known whether they were released or transferred to Iraqi custody.167
According to unofficial data collected by Human Rights Watch, "[s]ince
2003, the US has detained some 2,400 children in Iraq, including children as young
as 10. Detention rates rose drastically in 2007 to an average of 100 children a
month from 25 a month in 2006."I68 In early 2008, "US military authorities,
operating as the Multinational Forces in Iraq, were . . . holding 513 Iraqi children

as 'imperative threats to security,' and have transferred an unknown number of
other children to Iraqi custody."' 69
Many of the practices of detention and interrogation were in breach of the
ICCPR and the CRC. In violation of the ICCPR, 70 young children were not
separated from older ones;' 7 ' and in contradiction to the ICCPR, which demand
that suspects be treated "with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person," 72 children were interrogated "over the course of days or weeks
by military units in the field before being sent to the main detention centers."'7 In
spite of the ICCPR's guarantee of the right of due process and the right to be
"entitled to a fair and public hearing by a[n] . . . independent and impartial tribunal

established by law,"'

74

the children had "no real opportunity to challenge their

164. Id. art. 14.
165. CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149 (failing to mention child-specific protections).
166. Report of SG on Children in Armed Conflicts, supra note 161, 1 100.
167. HRW Report, supra note 156.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See ICCPR,supra note 4, art. 10(2)(b).
171. HRW Report, supra note 156 ("US officials earlier this year told Human Rights Watch that
they separate children from adults at these facilities but do not separate very young or particularly
vulnerable children from other child detainees.").
172. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 10(1).
173. HRW Report, supra note 156.
174. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 14.
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detention."' 75 They were "not provided with lawyers and [did] not attend the oneweek or one-month detention reviews after their transfer to [the detention facility
at] Camp Cropper."' 76 The conditions under which these children were detained
entailed physical abuse. 77 In contrast to the CRC's demand that the best interest
of the child be preferred, children had very limited contact with their families and
no efforts were made to ensure, as both the CRC and the ICCPR instruct, that
every child will be entitled to "such measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor." 78
While the US [did] assign each child a military "advocate" at the
mandatory six-month detention review, [the] advocate[s] ha[d] no
training in juvenile justice or child development.
As of February 2008, the reported average length of detention for
children was more than 130 days, and some children [were] detained for
more than a year without charge or trial, in violation of the Coalition
Provisional Authority memorandum on criminal procedures....
In August 2007, the United States opened Dar al-Hikmah (House
of Wisdom) at Camp Cropper with the stated intention to provide 600
detainees, ranging in age from 11 to 17, with educational services
pending release or transfer to Iraqi custody. However, in May 2008, US
military officials in Baghdad told Human Rights Watch that only "200
to 300" of the 513 child detainees were enrolled in classes at Dar alHikmah.' 79
Under "justice for children" in 2009:
Four mobile legal teams continued to provide assistance to boys in preand post-trial detention in Baghdad and Basra in 2010. Many of these
boys were accused of being involved in terrorist activities, which carries
a 15-year jail sentence if convicted. Others had been in detention
without a formal charge for more than 12 months. 80

Having discussed the co-application of human rights law with international
humanitarian law in occupied territories with regard to juvenile justice and having
critically examined the juvenile justice system applied by the United States in
formerly occupied Iraq, we now turn to an appraisal of juvenile justice in the
administered territories. We will first refer to the general legal framework applied
in these territories, and then discuss specifically the juvenile justice system.

175. HRW Report, supra note 156.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 24; CRC, supra note 1, art. 2.
179. HRW Report, supra note 156. See also CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, § 6(5)
(requiring anyone under the age of 18 to be released no later than 12 months after initial date of
detention).
180. Report of SG on Children in Armed Conflicts, supranote 161, T 100.
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JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE ISRAELI CASE

Israel has consistently claimed that international humanitarian law, including
both the laws of belligerent occupation and the laws of armed conflict, is the sole
legitimate legal regime in the occupied territories.'
However, this system that
was set up under security legislation and operated under military rule is beginning
to change. In the last several year, the military administered courts have started to
question the strict application of international humanitarian law, and have issued
rulings with dicta that have led to the adoption of some human rights principles in
regards to the rights of child prisoners. While this has been a positive step, there
are still concerns that these principles are not being adequately applied to match
the norms of international human rights law.
A.

Legal Regimes in the Administered Territories:International
HumanitarianLaw or InternationalHuman Rights Law?

Since Israel has claimed that international humanitarian law applies in the
occupied territories, it has objected to the application of human rights treaties in
the administered territories.182 In the most current report submitted to the
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 2011, and taking into
consideration the political changes that took place in the area, such as the Israeli
disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the establishment of Hamas
regime there in 2007, Israel maintained the following:
The applicability of the [International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights] to the West Bank or to the Gaza Strip has
been the subject of considerable debate in recent years....

. . . In these circumstances Israel can clearly not be said to have
effective control in the Gaza Strip, in the sense envisaged by the Hague
Regulations.
It is against this background that Israel is called-on to consider the

relationship between different legal spheres, primarily the Law of
Armed Conflict and Warfare and Human Rights Law.... For its part,

Israel recognizes that there is a profound connection between Human
Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict . . . . However, in the
current state of international law and state-practice worldwide, it is

181. See STATE OF ISRAEL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL: ISRAEL'S REPLIES TO LIST OF ISSUES TO BE TAKEN UP IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF ISRAEL'S THIRD PERIODIC REPORT CONCERNING ARTICLES

I TO 15 OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

(E/C. 12/ISR/3) 3-5 (2011) [hereinafter Israel's Replies]. For previous expressions of the Israeli position,
see Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Additional
Information Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant Following the Consideration of Their Reports
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Addendum: Israel, Econ. & Soc. Council,
2-3, U.N. Doc. E/1989/5/Add.14 (May 14, 2001) (containing additional information submitted by
Israel to the Council following the consideration of their reports by the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights); Human Rights Comm., Considerations of Reports, supra note 119,T 8.
182. We will explain below that the Israeli Supreme Court has taken a nuanced view in Part VB.
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Israel's view that these two systems-of-law, which are codified in
separate instruments, nevertheless remain distinct and apply in different
circumstances.
Furthermore, Israel has never made a specific declaration in which
it reserved the right to extend the applicability of the Convention with
respect to the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Clearly . . . in the absence

of such a voluntarily-made declaration, the Convention, which is a
territorially bound Convention, does not apply, nor was it intended to
apply, to areas outside its national territory.1
Hence, Israel's position can be summarized as a rejection of the application of
treaties in territories that are, according to Israel's interpretation of the "under its
jurisdiction" clause, outside its sovereign territory and jurisdiction. 184 Israel's
refusal to enact human rights treaties in the administered territories and the lack of
effective control in Gaza are used as explanations for its claim that these territories
are not under its jurisdiction.' 8 5 Israel also supports its position through its
interpretation that human rights law and international humanitarian law are
possibly mutually exclusive.
In contrast to the Israeli government position, the Israeli Supreme Court has
recently expressed the view that even though human rights law treaties do not
directly apply in the occupied territories, human rights law serves as a source for
filling in lacunas in the lex specialis-that is, international humanitarian lawgoverning the administered territories. 8 7 This assertion is compatible with the
doctrine of mutual application of human rights law and international humanitarian
183. Israel's Replies, supranote 181, at 4-5 (emphasis added). While the ICESCR and ICCPR have
different jurisdictional standards, Israel has made similar statements in reference to the applicability of
the ICCPR. Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(1) ("Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . ."), with International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 2(l), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means....").
184. Human Rights Comm., Considerations of Reports, supra note 119,
8 ("Israel has
consistently maintained that the [ICCPR] does not apply to areas that are not subject to its sovereign
territory and jurisdiction. This position is based on the well-established distinction between human
rights and humanitarian law under international law. Accordingly, in Israel's view, the Committee's
mandate cannot relate to events in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, inasmuch as they are part and
parcel of the context of armed conflict as distinct from a relationship of human rights."). See also BenNaftali & Shany, supranote 99, at 33-38 (explaining the treaty interpretation argument).
185. Israel's Replies, supranote 181, at 3-5. See also Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 38-40
(explaining the effective control argument).
186. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 27-33.
187. See HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459, J 18-21
[2006] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf;
HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense
16 [20091 (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/07/500/021/ml9/07021500.ml9.pdf; CrimA (TA) 6659/06 A v.
State
of
Israel
T
9
(2008)
(lsr.),
available
at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/06/590/066/nO4/06066590.nO4.htm.
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law that we discussed above and claimed to reflect contemporary international law
doctrine on this issue. Moreover, it strengthens the other claim this article
maintains: that is, that a long-term belligerent occupying power that is required to
increasingly take on the powers of a sovereign government in its relations with the
population it controls can best fulfill this role by applying human rights law in
addition to belligerent occupation law.
The following subsection examines the current juvenile justice system applied
in the administered territories, revealing how a co-application of the laws of
belligerent occupation and human rights law solves certain deficiencies in the
system and best serves the objectives of a long-term occupation in the territories.
B.

The Juvenile Justice System in the Administered Territories

The juvenile justice system in the administered territories is applied under the
general legal framework of these territories by the belligerent occupant."s This
system is composed of security legislationl 89 and the laws of belligerent occupation
of international law-primarily, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague
Regulationsl 90-and a judicial system of military courts. 191
A juvenile justice system in general, and in the administered territories in
particular, requires actions such as detention and interrogation to be undertaken by
several authorities. The first of these is the enforcing authority, which in the
administered territories includes "a network of military bases, interrogation and
detention centers and police stations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and in
Israel."l 92 "Palestinians, predominantly from the West Bank, are initially taken to
one of these facilities for questioning and temporary detention."1 93 Later, the
system requires the involvement of the judicial authority in the adjudication
process.1 94
In this section, we will focus on the current developments in the judicial
authority system in terms of legislation governing its conduct and in terms of its
actual practice. We will consider first the significant improvements in the
absorption and application of norms that forward the best interest of the child
concept prompted by human rights law instruments discussed above. Then we will
examine criticism aimed both at the judicial procedures and at the procedures of
interrogation and detention.

188. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2008, No. 1651, §§ 8, 10
(Isr.), available at http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/mil01.
189. Zvi Hadar, The Military Courts, in I MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 171, 177 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).

190. David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel, 94 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 207, 209-10 (2012).

191. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1651, §§ 8-20.
192. DEF. FOR CHILDREN INT'L: PALESTINE, BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED: CHILDREN
HELD IN MILITARY DETENTION 15 (2012) [hereinafter BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED],
available at http://www.dci-palestine.org/sites/default/files/report_0.pdf.

193. Id.
194. Id.
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However, before turning to discuss the juvenile justice system applied by the
military legislation and courts, we will make a short reference to the Palestinian
Authority's legal perception of minors under criminal law.195 The relevance of
such a detour lies in the fact that, as we suggest in Section IV(A) above, the local
perception of human rights norms may affect the application of human rights law
in occupied territories that is promulgated by this article.
The Palestinian Child Law defines a juvenile as a person who has not yet
attained the age of eighteen.' 96 The law's objectives are to raise the prestige of the
children of Palestine; to promote children's national pride and religious identity; to
foster loyalty to Palestine, its land, its history, and its people; to encourage both
children's freedom and their responsibility to civil society solidarity; and to create
a balance between rights and obligations.' 97 Emphasizing the values of justice,
equality, tolerance, and democracy, the law aims at protecting children's rights to
survive, grow, and enjoy a free, secure, and advanced life.' 98 It also aims to raise
public awareness of children's rights and to use appropriate measures for achieving
this purpose.' 99 Finally, the law encourages social involvement of children in their
environment according to their age, abilities, and degree of maturity, and aims at
fostering their creativity and independence while ensuring they preserve respect for
parents and family. 200
In addition, a draft of Youth Protection Law has been pending since 201 1,201
which the Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority has not yet signed and
ratified. The purpose of the draft law is to expand the legal treatment of juvenile
cases in several areas. 202 The guiding principle is respect for children's rights,
rehabilitation, and integration in society.2 03 This draft forbids the prosecution of
any person younger than twelve at the time of committing the criminal offense, 20 4
and it regulates the methods of punishment of minors under the age of fifteen, 205

195. See Israel-Palestinian Liberation Organization: Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, Annex IV, art. 1, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551, 635 (stipulating that the Palestinian
Authority is authorized to conduct criminal procedures and trials in cases that are not related to the
security of the area in which the victim is not Israeli); see, e.g., Agreement on the Gaza Strip and
Jericho Area, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, Annex 1, arts. 5-7, May 4, 1994, U.N. Doc
A/49/180 [hereinafter The Cairo Agreement].
196. Palestinian
Child
Law
No.
7,
art.
1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.crin.org/Law/instrument.asp?lnstlD=1476.
197. Id. arts. 2(l)-(3).
198. Id. art. 2(4).
199. Id. art. 2(5).
200. Id. art. 2(6).
201. Draft Youth Protection Act 2011 (Palestine). See also DEF. FOR CHILDREN INT'L: PALESTINE
SECTION,

ANNUAL

REPORT

2012,

at

28

(2013),

available

at

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/annualreport2012.pdf (mentioning the Palestinian
Juvenile Protection Law Draft approved by the Ministerial Council in October 2011).
202. See generally Draft Youth Protection Act 2011 (Palestine).
203. Id. art. 1.
204. Id. art. 6.
205. Id. arts. 38-47.
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and the methods of treatment of minors over the age fifteen. 206 It also orders the
establishment of juvenile courts and discusses the legal procedures that apply
there,207 such as the manners of processing and control of convicted minors.208
This law also relates to the establishment of the Center for Child Protection by the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services. 2 09
What becomes clear from the review of the Palestinian Authority's legal
perception of minors in criminal procedures is that their treatment in criminal
systems should be guided by specific human rights values that refer to children
under the CRC. This concept is consistent with that of the juvenile justice system
applied by the military administration discussed below.
As mentioned above, the juvenile justice system in the administered territories
is based on the security legislation in the administrated territories and the dicta of
the military courts. 210 On "June 7, 1967, the first day of operation of the military
government in the West Bank, three proclamations and several orders were
published throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." 211 These orders set forth
legal procedures in the military courts and defined the offenses and penalties to be
imposed upon offenders. 212 "Since then, the [Security Provisions Order ("SPO")]
has been the basic enactment regarding military jurisdiction in these Regions." 2 13
The SPO was amended numerous times up until 2011, when it was issued as a
consolidated version containing all the preceding amendments and unifying all
remaining valid military orders into one instrument.214
The military courts system established by the SPO consists of two courts of
first instance, one for the region of Judea and the second for the region of Samaria,
as well as an appeals court.215 The substantive law applied in these courts consists
of local statutes and orders issued by the military commander, in his capacity as
the sovereign power in the occupied territory under international humanitarian
law.216 The rules of evidence and procedure are similar to those applied in Israel,
including legal representation for defendants and the right for a due process of
law.21 7 The prosecution is conducted by the military prosecutor and the trial is

206. Id. art. 48.
207. Id. arts. 26-36.
208. Id. arts. 49-57.
209. Id. art. 65.
210. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2008, No. 1651, §§ 8-20
(Isr.), available at http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/milOl.
211. YESH

DIN:

VOLUNTEERS

FOR

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

BACKYARD

PROCEEDINGS:

THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN THE MILITARY COURTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

36 (2007), available at http://www.yesh-din.org/site/images/BackyardProceedingsEng.pdf.
212. Id. at 45-46.
213. Hadar, supra note 189, at 177.
214. Since that time, the Order has been amended repeatedly, and constitutes up to 31 amendments
at the time of this writing.
215. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1651, §§ 9, 10(D).
216. See Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
217. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1651, §§ 77, 86, 88.
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conducted solely by judges possessing particular legal experience.218 According to
decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court dating from the early days of the military
administration, all of the procedures in these courts may be subject to review by
the Supreme Court of Israel, in cases when defendants apply to the Supreme Court
claiming violation of their rights.219
In the past few years, and officially since 2009,220 the juvenile justice system,
governed by the legislative and judicial system described above, has undergone
remarkable changes and improvements led by the military courts' dicta. 22 1 Before
2009, there were no significant differences between criminal procedures for adults
and those for minors in the administered territories.222 If any special attention was
given to minors in procedures at the military courts, it was mainly in authorizing
the court to close hearings to the public 22 3 and forbidding the publication of the
defendants' names.224
However, without a formal legislative foundation and relying on common law
judicial legislation, the military courts' dicta have enabled an on-going process of
changes aimed at applying higher standards, more in line with human rights law
norms, in the juvenile justice system in the administered territories. 225 This
venture eventually led to formal changes in the security provisions order.226
Seeking creative solutions that would focus on rehabilitation instead of retribution
at sentencing, the military courts gave considerable weight to the age of the
juvenile, stating:
When sentencing a minor, especially one who just reached the age of
criminal liability, a minor without previous convictions, a minor who
was lucky enough that his offense did not cause substantial damage to
property or to human lives, it is proper to avoid severe punishment and

218. Id. §§ I I(A)(1), I l(A)(4), 123(B).
219. See Kretzmer, supra note 190, at 234.
220. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1644 came into force on July 29, 2009. New Military
Order on Juveniles Issued in the West Bank, DEF. FOR CHILDREN INT'L: PALESTINE (Aug. 25, 2009),

http://www.dci-pal.org/english/display.cfm?Docld=1223&Categoryld=l. As it is a temporary order, it
has to be annually renewed. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644
(Amend. No. 109) (Isr.).
221. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
222. STEPHEN SEDLEY ET AL., CHILDREN IN MILITARY CUSTODY 4 (2012), available at
http://www.childreninmilitarycustody.org/wp-

content/uploads/2012/03/Children inMilitaryCustody FullReport.pdf. However, younger offenders
were able to receive custodial sentences in "an institute of social care." See NOAM HOFFSTADTER,
PUBLIC COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., PERIODIC REPORT: JUNE 2008-No DEFENSE: SOLDIER

VIOLENCE
AGAINST
PALESTINIAN
DETAINEES
14
n.39
(2008),
available
at
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/No Defense Eng.pdf.
223. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5730-1970, No. 378, § 11
(lsr.), availableat http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israelmilitaryorders/fulltext/mo0378.htm.
224. See id.
225. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
226. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644 (Amend. No. 109)
(Isr.); contra SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 4 (mentioning that even with the new procedures in

2009, there were still incidences of those under eighteen that were treated as adults).
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give the minor hope and a chance to mend one's ways while he is in his
natural environment and surrounded by his family.227
The minor's age is also a crucial factor in remand hearings, where minors'
age is a strong consideration for release.228 In addition, the military courts ordered
the release of suspects and defendants when they discovered that some of their
rights were impaired during the penal procedures, even when these rights were not
included in formal legislation but were rather an outcome of judge-made
legislation.229
All of these defacto changes have resulted in dejure changes in the military
legislation in the administered territories. In 2009, the security order was amended
to establish the Military Youth Court.230 Professional qualification training was
given to the judges who were appointed as youth judges and special legislative
regulations were made to put more emphasis on the rehabilitation of convicted
minors in the area. 231 The main changes in the regulations of the security order
were as follows: only youths were to be tried in the Military Youth Court and the
indictment against a minor must state the minor's date of birth; the Military Youth
Court was authorized to appoint an advocate for the minor if justified by the
minor's best interest; the court was enabled to make use of a report prepared by the
welfare officer in the civil administration before sentencing; the separation of
minors (up to the age of sixteen) and adults in detention facilities was legally
determingd; the court was authorized to order that the minor's parents be present at
all hearings of the case and that they could act in certain instances in their child's
name (such as by handling petitions to court or examining witnesses).232
227. Mil. Appeal 58/00 Military Court of Appeals (Judea & Samaria), 0. K. v. Military Prosecutor
(May 30, 2000), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (translated by author).
228. See
Military
Court
Decisions,
MIL.
COURT
WATCH,
http://militarycourtwatch.org/print.php?id=706zUIAHaTa31383A58dQYNef4o (last visited July 17,
2014).
229. For example, the courts ruled that night-time investigation may lead to release on bail,
although at that point such a limitation was not yet mandated to the Security Legislation. See Mil.
Appeal 2763/09 Military Court of Appeals (Judea & Samaria), A. A. v. Military Prosecutor (Aug. 2,
2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); Mil. Appeal 2912/09 Military Court of Appeals
(Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. A. R. (Aug. 27, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.) (translated by author). The same was ruled regarding investigation by a person
unqualified to investigate minors. Mil. Appeal 2763/09; ef Mil. Appeal 1781/11 Military Court of
Appeals (Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. M. (June 15, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.) (translated by author) (where the court emphasized that the investigators should
allow the detainee reasonable time to sleep and rest; however, the court did not find that a complaint for
lack of sleep justified the detainee's release from custody). The courts had also given weight in remand
hearings to the infringement of the right of representation. See Mil. Appeal 2912/09. Most significantly,
there are explicit court rulings determining that prolonged procedures may lead to the release of
defendants (and particularly minors) from remand. See Mil. Appeal 1411/11 Military Court of Appeals
(Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. D. A. S. (Mar. 22, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
230. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644 (Amend. No. 109) (Isr.).
231. See id.; see also BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at I1.
232. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644. Although the amendment does not refer to
remand hearings, the courts are strict about holding public hearings in general and about the presence of
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Furthermore, it was determined that in criminal offences a minor would not be
indicted for a crime committed one year before the indictment was filed, and in
security offences, a minor will not be prosecuted for offences committed more than
two years before the indictment without permission from the Chief Military
Prosecutor.233
In 2011, further amendments were issued by the new consolidated military
order that introduced a line of substantial amendments regarding the treatment of
minors in the penal procedure. 234 Amendment number ten raised the age of
majority from sixteen to eighteen, so that from the date of its entering into force
forward all the newly and previously instituted special procedures defined for
minors were officially valid for youths under the age of eighteen. 235 In this
amendment, all the developments of the 2009 security order regarding juvenile
justice were adopted, but this time referring to minors up to the age of eighteen. 236
It established the duty of the police to inform the minors of their right to a legal
counsel before interrogation, and to inform parents or other legal guardians about a
minor's arrest and interrogation. 237 Finally, the limitation period for indictments of
regular criminal offences was shortened to one year, while the limitation period for
indictments of national security related offences remained the same (two years).238
Amendment number sixteen determined the shortening of the period of
detention before judicial review for all detainees. 239 The maximum period of
detention before being brought before a judge was set at forty-eight hours for
ordinary crimes and ninety-six hours for security offences (with the option of
limited extension in special circumstances).24 0 If no warrant is issued within these

parents in particular at remand hearings. See ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS'N,
EYES ON ISRAELI MILITARY COURT: A COLLECTION OF IMPRESSIONS 5 (2012), available at

http://www.addameer.org/files/Reports/Eyes%20on%20Israeli%2OMilitary%2OCourt%20impressions.pdf (demonstrating that hearings were public as NGOs were able to attend and view
them); SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 4 (highlighting that "parents are allowed to participate"). In
certain cases, defendants were released because their family members were prevented from being
present at the hearings. See Mil. Appeal 2912/09 Military Court of Appeals.
233. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644, art. 46(J).
234. Compare Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644, with Order Regarding Security
Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676 (Amend. No. 10) (lsr.), available at
http://www.dci-palestine.org/sites/default/files/militaryorder 1676.pdf (unofficial translation).
235. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1676, § 3.
236. See id.
237. Id. § 4.
238. Compareid. § 5, with Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1644, art. 46(J).
239. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1685 (Amend. No. 16)
(Isr.) (translated by author). This was established in August 2012. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S
FUND., CHILDREN IN ISRAELI MILITARY DETENTION: OBSERVATIONS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9

(2013)
[hereinafter
CHILDREN
IN ISRAELI
MILITARY
DETENTION],
available at
http://www.unicef.org/oPt/UNICEFoPtChildren-inIsraeliMilitaryDetention Observations and R
ecommendations_-_6_March_2013.pdf. See also DCI-Pal: Children Prosecuted in Israeli Military
Courts-Update,SAMIDOUN (Oct. 2, 2012), http://samidoun.ca/2012/10/dci-pal-children-prosecuted-inisraeli-military-courts-update.
240. See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1685.
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periods, the suspect is released. 24 1 The court may not order the detention of a
suspect for longer than twenty days, but it may extend a period of detention several
times for periods of up to fifteen days each upon further review.242 A suspect may
not be detained for an overall period that exceeds forty days without being
indicted.24 3
In amendments twenty five and twenty six, issued a few months later, a
reduction of initial detention periods was set specifically for minors so that minors
under the age of fourteen are to be brought before a judge within a maximum
period of twenty-four hours after their detention with regard to all types of
offences (with the option of an extra twenty four hours extension in special
circumstances).244 Minors between the age of fourteen and eighteen are to be
brought before a judge within a maximum period of forty-eight hours from their
detention, with regard to all types of offences (with the option of an extra fortyeight hours extension in special circumstances).245 In addition, minors are to be
brought before the Military Court of Appeals in cases where they were maintained
in custody longer than one year, after filling an indictment without reaching a
verdict.246 Any extension in this concern must be determined by the court every
three months. 247
Amendment number twenty-four refers to the translation of procedures in the
military courts from Hebrew to Arabic. 2 48 The proceedings in the military courts

241. See id. Contra SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 29.
242. See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1685.

243. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1726 (Amend. No. 40)
(translated by author); see also DEF. FOR CHILDREN
OVERVIEW

SEPTEMBER

2013,

at

1

INT'L: PALESTINE, DETENTION

(2013),

available

at

BULLETIN:

http://www.dci-

palestine.org/sites/default/files/september_2013_detention bulletin final 4nov2013.pdf.
But
see,
ADDAMER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUM. RTS. Ass'N, DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY OF A
PERSON AS A CRIME OF APARTHEID: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON PALESTINE 2

(2011),

available

at

http://www.addameer.org/userfiles/Addameer%/20Testimony%20for%/ 20Russell%20Tribunal%20on%2
(stating detention of
OPalestine%20-%205%20November%20201 1%5B20111108155735%5D.pdf
Palestinians can be renewed up to 180 days).
244. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1711 (Amend. No. 25)
(Isr.) (translated by author). See also CHILDREN IN ISRAELI MILITARY DETENTION, supra note 239, at 9.
245. See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1711. See also CHILDREN IN ISRAELI MILITARY
DETENTION, supra note 239, at 9.
246. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1712 (Amend. No. 26) (Isr.)
(translated by author).
247. Id.
248. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1710 (Amend. No. 24)

(lsr.) (translated by author). See also High Court of Justice Calls Attention to the Obligation to
Translate Indictments to Arabic in Cases Before Military Courts (HCJ 2775/11), NEWSLETTER
(Embassy of Isr., Den Haag, Neth.), Apr. 18, 2013, at 2 [hereinafter Embassy of Isr., NEWSLETTER],
http://embassies.gov.il/hagueat
available
en/Departments/Documents/20130418 Newsletterl I ILD.pdf (providing unofficial English translation)
("The general question regarding whether there exists an obligation to translate all military courts
decisions [and not just indictments] in order to facilitate the possibility of utilizing them as precedents,
has not been sufficiently argued and is not the subject-matter of this petition.").
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in the administered territories are conducted mainly in Hebrew and translated to
Arabic during the course of the proceedings by court interpreters. 249 Amendment
number twenty-four determines that all the indictments must be translated to
Arabic. 250
The above notwithstanding, it is worth considering several critical
observations with regard to the procedures undertaken by the judicial authority,
including the interrogation and arrest process, and a comparison with the Israeli
juvenile justice system. We will first briefly address the criticism of methods of
interrogation and detention undertaken by the enforcing authorities-even though
these issues venture beyond the scope of this paper.
Several non-governmental organizations have harshly criticized the process of
detention and interrogation of Palestinian minors by the Israeli Defense Forces.2 5'
According to the Defence for Children (Palestine) report of April 2012, over the
past eleven years around 7,500 children are estimated to have been detained by the
Israeli forces in the administered territories.252 According to the B'Tselem report
of July 2011, between the years 2005 and 2010, more than 800 minors were
prosecuted for stone throwing. 253 Some NGO's-basing their findings on
interviews with detainees and others who escorted them through detention,
interrogation, and imprisonment-report severe violations of the rights of
254
minors.
According to Defence for Children International (Palestine),
testimonies reveal that most children undergo a coercive interrogation that mixes
verbal abuse, threats, and physical violence; approaches torture or inhumane
treatment; and usually results in a confession. 2 55 "The Report also finds that in 29
percent of cases, the children are either shown, or made to sign, documentation
written in Hebrew, a language they do not understand." 256
According to a report of a delegation of British lawyers on the treatment of
Palestinian children under Israeli military law, most of the interrogations of
children are executed without the presence of a lawyer representing the childreflecting, according to this delegation, a violation of Military Order 1676.257 The

249.
250.
251.
252.

Embassy of Isr., NEWSLETTER, supra note 248, at 2.
See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1710.
See, e.g., BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 22-29, 34-38.

Id. at 7.

253. BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at 5.
254. See, e.g., BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 22-50; SEDLEY ET AL.,

supra note 222, at 30-31.
255. See BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 7.

256. Id.
257. See SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 18. However, Order No. 1676 provides that children be
notified of their right to consult with a lawyer and it does not order the lawyer's presence at the
investigation. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676, § 4
at
http://www.dci10)
(Isr.),
available
(Amend.
No.
palestine.org/sites/default/files/military order 1676.pdf (unofficial translation) ("Prior to the
investigation of an arrested minor suspect, the investigator will inform a defense attorney named by the
minor, detailsregarding [sic] the investigation; without prejudice to the instructions of any law,
informing of the defense attorney named by the minor as detailed above, will not delay the
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British lawyers' report continues to claim that parents are not present at
interrogations, 25 and that the children are generally not informed of their right to
remain silent during the interrogation. 259 Children are arrested during night hours
with no parental accompaniment and are violently treated by the arresting
soldiers.2 60 In addition, some children report having been detained in solitary
confinement,261 a practice that according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Torture amounts to torture when used against juveniles. 262 Finally, the report
points out that periods of detention before and during trial are equal for adults and
minors. 263
Criticism has also been aimed at the procedures in the judicial system. 264 It is
important to note that the Military Youth Court functions only in trials and not in
interim hearings, bail hearings included,265 and hence the implications of the
reform described above are quite limited. Furthermore, because the practices of
the court deviate somewhat from the law, the significant amendments in the
military legislation are not always scrupulously followed. Legal practice is full of
investigation.") (amending article 136(c)). It should be nevertheless mentioned that despite the criticism
expressed by the British lawyers delegation of the means of law enforcement and application by law
enforcement authorities, the delegation did not criticize the work of the military courts or the military
youth courts. See SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 30 ("As we have explained, we have been given
two radically different accounts of Israeli practice. It is not our role to adjudicate between them. But
within them are certain undisputed facts which compel us to conclude that Israel is in breach . . . of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.").
258. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 18. However, "Military Order 1676 requires 'notification'
of a parent but does not make provision for the parent's attendance at the interrogation." Id.
259. See id. at 16.
260. BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at 26-27; SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 17. The
criticism of the law enforcement means in the juvenile justice system in the administered territories
presented above demands serious consideration and response. However, given that this article focuses
on the military youth courts and not on the enforcement means and authorities, we must leave this
discussion to another study. Nevertheless, we will mention briefly that the military courts have not
disregarded the criticism and many of the changes in formal legislation were perhaps motivated by
NGO claims. The B'Tselem report even maintains that the Military Courts are leaders and initiators in
bringing about change and protection of minors' rights. See BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at
71 ("[O]ne can establish beyond doubt that the Military Courts have initiated and led for changes in the
behavioral norms of the enforcement officials in all that concerns the rights of the Minors.").
261. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 27; see also Harriet Sherwood, The PalestinianChildrenAlone and Bewildered-in Israel's Al Jalame Jail, GUARDIAN,
Jan.
22, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/22/palestinian-children-detained-jail-israel.
262. See Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights
Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
77,
transmitted by Note of Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) (by Juan E. Mindez); see
also SEDLEY ET AL., supranote 222, at 27.
263. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 27. This was changed by Amendments 16, 25, and 26 of the
Order regarding Security Provisions. See supranotes 239-47 and accompanying text.
264. See No LEGAL FRONTIERS, ALL GUlLTY!: OBSERVATIONS IN THE MILITARY JUVENILE COURT

APRIL
2010-MARCH
2011,
at
10
(2011),
available
at
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/images/stories/report 2011/report en.pdf.
265. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 23 (determining, inter alia, the jurisdiction of the youth
courts).
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examples of these failures, as is demonstrated by a survey of seventy-one cases in
the Youth Court conducted by the NGO, No Legal Frontiers. 266 In this survey, it
was found that numerous indictments are based on the defendants' confessions or
on incriminations of co-partners given to the police during the interrogation;267
most of the cases conclude with a plea bargain;2 68 and, most importantly, actual
imprisonment is usually the default sentence and is imposed as a first rather than a
last resort, especially in cases where the accused was detained during the whole or
part of the legal procedure. 269 This is due to the fact that there are no substantial
Palestinian welfare services, and even the military judges expressed frustration at
the lack of alternatives to imprisonment:
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that when punishing minors the
following factors should be taken into consideration: the lesser
responsibility that should be attributed to a minor whose personality is
not yet fully formed, the damage caused to the minor by actual
imprisonment, damage that is ultimately against the public interest, and
on the other hand the severity of the crime.
The situation in the Region is even worse than in Israel in such
cases, because the juvenile court does not have any rehabilitation
instruments such as: ordered stays in locked facilities, parole officers
and so on. . . . It is clear that creating rehabilitation instruments in the
Region is not easy, especially when the crimes in question are often
committed for ideological reasons and supported by the community
surrounding the minor. In any case, I believe that the legislator in the
Region cannot avoid addressing this issue and finding creative ways to
allow minors to be treated outside of the framework of actual prison. 270
Other practices in the juvenile court also attest to the failure of the military
legislation regulating the administered territories' juvenile justice system to fully
meet the legal standards of juvenile justice vested in human rights law, in spite of

266. No LEGAL FRONTIERS, supra note 264, at 8. It should be noted that this report has been

strongly rejected by the IDF Spokesman. See Letter from IDF Spokesperson, to Organization Law
Without Borders, Response to Report on Military Jurisdiction (Aug. 30, 2011). In a response to the No
Legal Frontiers report, the IDF Spokesman raises claims against both its factual determinations and the
scientific validity of its statistical methods. Id. 1 4. With regard to the factual claims, the Spokesman
states that contrary to the report, most Palestinian minors are not held in custody until the end of their
trials. Id. The Spokesman adds that the report disregards major developments in both the security
legislation and the military courts dicta, which improved the protections for minors in the criminal
procedure in the administered territories. Id. 5. Regarding the report's scientific statistical methods,
the Spokesman claims that the report's findings are not based on the basic principles of the science of
statistics. Id. 4. In its response, the No Legal Frontiers stated that this report is not a scientific
representative sample but rather a representation of the impression of reviewers who observed the
procedures. See Letter from No Legal Frontiers, answer to the response of the IDF Spokesman to the
No Legal Frontiers Report (translated by author).
267. No LEGAL FRONTIERS, supranote 264, at 28.
268. Id. at 37-38; SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 22.
269. See No LEGAL FRONTIERS, supranote 264, at 44.

270. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis and quotations omitted).
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the changes that have been made. 2 71 These standards are motivated primarily to
preserve the best interests of the child and promote "the child's sense of dignity
and worth . . . and the desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the

child's assuming a constructive role in society." 272 The British lawyers' report
states that children are brought into the court in iron shackles, which, while
removed on their entering the courtroom, are replaced when they leave. 273 The
report mentions that this practice stands in contrast to the United Nations standard
minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners:
Which provide that chains and irons shall not be used as restraints; that

any other restraints should only be used as a protection against escape
during transfer provided they are removed when the prisoner appears

before a judicial authority (or on medical grounds or to prevent injury);
and that they should not be applied for any longer period than
necessary. 274
Finally, criticism of the juvenile justice system in the administered territories
has been made through a comparison between this system and the juvenile justice
system within Israel's borders. 2 75 Some major examples are the discrepancies
between the minimum age for custodial sentences,276 the right of parents to be
present during interrogations,277 and the maximum periods of detention without
271. See The Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law, 5731-1971, 25 LSI 128
(1970-1971) (Isr.) (demonstrating that Israel has passed a specific law for treatment of its juveniles
within its domestic system).
272. CRC, supranote 1, art. 40(1).
273. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 23.
274. Id. See also UNITED NATIONS, STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF
at
available
(1955),
5
PRISONERS
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminaljustice/UN StandardMinimum Rules-for-theTreatment-of Pris

oners.pdf.
275. The issues relating to days of detention have been brought before the Israeli Supreme Court.
Because a new amendment to the security order was to be applied with regard to the case of juveniles,
the Court has decided to leave the applications pending until 1/12/2012, when the respondents (i.e., the
Minister of Defence and the IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria) were to report to the Court on the
application of the order. The applications are still pending until the time of this writing. See HCJ

3368/10 Office of the Palestinian Prisoners v. Minister of Defense (Isr.); HCJ 4057/10 The Association
of Civil Rights in Israel v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria (1sr.). See also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: ISRAEL'S DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN THE
at
available
(2010),
34
TERRITORIES
PALESTINIAN
OCCUPIED

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ioptl21 0webwcover.pdf.
276. The minimum age for custodial sentencing is fourteen for Israeli youth in Israel and twelve in
the administered territories. Compare The Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law
(Isr.), § 10(c)(2), with Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676,
http://www.dciat
available
(Isr.),
10)
No.
(Amend.
palestine.org/sites/default/files/militaryorder 1676.pdf (unofficial translation); see also BOUND,
BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 19.

277. According to the Israeli Youth Law, a parent is allowed to be present at all times in
circumstances where the child has not been formally arrested, but may not intervene in the interrogation
process. The Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law (1sr.),

§ 9(H).

Exceptions are

made upon written authorization of an officer and in cases in which the well-being of the child requires
that the parent is not present. Id. §§ 9(I)-(J). No such right formally exists for Palestinian youth even
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having a right to consult a lawyer.278 An application before the Israeli Supreme
Court to make the legal protections of minors in the administered territories equal
to those of Israeli minors is now pending. 2 79
Any comparison between the Israeli juvenile justice system and that in the
administered territories remains untenable unless we take into consideration the
differences between the crimes committed by minors in Israel and those committed
by juveniles in the administered territories. Many of the latter crimes are
perpetrated for ideological reasons with the encouragement of the minor's friends
and family and even the support of recruiters for terrorist organizations. 280
Another difference is the absence of welfare services for minors in the
administered territories,2 8 1 a situation that is partially the result of transferring the
welfare services in the area to the Palestinian Authority according to the Oslo
Accords.282
All of the above criticism reflects the need to apply a normative framework
for the practical application of human rights law in the juvenile justice system in
the administered territories. Indeed, security considerations of the occupying
power should not be excluded, however analysis of the particular circumstances
calls for a co-application of international humanitarian law and human rights law,
and not only a reliance upon the latter as the source of international law in
occupied territories. The effects of such a normative framework on military
legislation and its application by the judicial system will be to promote concepts
such as the best interests of the child and the preference of rehabilitation over
retribution. It will also strengthen trends in the military legislation and the military
courts, discussed earlier in this article. In the words of the Military Court:
Amendment number fourteen to the Israeli Youth Law . . . has
provided the police with special obligations pertaining to the
interrogation of minors. The essence of this amendment was a new
conception, in the spirit of the InternationalConvention on the Rights of
the Child and in accordance with the Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty. . . . Th[is] amendment has not been incorporated into the
military legislation in the area, yet . . . the Military Appeals Court has
opined that "it is impossible to ignore the . . . principles at the

though efforts are made to notify parents of their child being interrogated, there is only a right to be
notified if there is an arrest. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1676 (Isr.); see also BOUND,
BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 18. See also Order Regarding Security Provisions
(Judea and Samaria), No. 1644, art. 46(L)(b) (Amend. No. 109) (Isr.) (giving parents the right to attend
sessions of the military court).
278. See BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at 14.
279. See id.
280. Moodrick-Even Khen, supra note 44, at 269-70 (describing the motivations for children in
occupied territories to join armed groups and perpetrate crimes).
281. See File No. 3905/10 Military Court (Judea), Military Prosecutor v. Mohammed Omar (Jan.
17, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (1sr.).
282. See The Cairo Agreement, supra note 195, art. 3.

2014

JUVENILE JUSTICE INBELLIGERENT OCCUPATION REGIMES

159

foundation of the protection of the minor's rights . . . and the need to
emphasize the supra principle of the minor's best interests.283
Promoting the best interest of the child and developing an improved welfare
system reflect the obligations of a long-term occupying force to promote the
interests of the protected persons and to ensure public life and not only public
order. However, as long as the Israeli government objects to a direct application of
human rights law in the administered territories, the standards and norms of human
rights law, including soft law, should be applied in the administered territories
through their incorporation within the security legislation in the territories. This
solution lacks the advantage of enabling the supervising mechanisms of
international bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee or other U.N. treaty and
Charter bodies, to monitor Israel's compliance with international human rights
treaty standards in the administered territories; nor would it allow these bodies to
influence public opinion in Israel and outside. 284 Nevertheless, this solution does
demand that human rights standards that are relevant to the juvenile justice system
in the administered territories are obligatory upon the governing authorities in
these areas, ensuring that their role and function as temporary holders of the
territory are adequately fulfilled.
VI. SUMMARY
Long-term belligerent occupations and transformative occupations face new
challenges in terms of the occupying forces' relations with the occupied population
and their obligations towards the protected persons. Applying a compatible and
just juvenile justice system in occupied territories is one such challenge.
We rely on contemporary theory and practice in international law that
supports a mutual application of human rights law and international humanitarian
law, where one of these branches of international law is the lex specialis and the
other may serve as a complementary or interpretative legal framework. We
suggest that this model is most appropriate for the long-term belligerent occupying
force and for the transformative occupying force to fulfill their legal obligations in
general, in particular in establishing a juvenile justice system. We applied this
claim to the case studies of the juvenile justice system in formerly occupied Iraq
and in Israel's administered territories.
In Iraq, the legal framework of the occupation regime was based both on U.N.
Security Council resolutions and in the CPA Memorandum, situating it explicitly
on the laws of belligerent occupation and implicitly on human rights law.2 85 The
283. File No. 1367/11 Military Court (Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. D. A. (Jan. 9,
2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (1sr.) (translated by author); see also Mil. Youth Court
3905-10, Military Prosecution v. M. A. (Jan. 17, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.)
(translated by author) ("The military courts have often opined that every effort should be made, subject
to the special circumstances in the Region, to equalize as much as possible the situation concerning
minors in the Region with the situation in Israel.").
284. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 106.
285. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, pmbl., 8(g); CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149,
pmbl.
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CPA incorporated only the general standards of human rights law, 286 and with
regard to human rights law norms that relate to minors' protection, it established
only the demand that children be separated from adults while in custody. 28 7 In
practice, even these limited demands have continuously been violated, and this
violation persisted after the U.N. mandate for the occupation ended. 288
In the administered territories, significant progress in both the military
legislation and its application by the military courts has taken place since 2009,
when the Military Youth Courts were established. Before 2009, there were no
significant differences between criminal procedures for adults and those for minors
in the administered territories. 289 However, with the support of the military courts'
dicta, an on-going process of changes aimed at applying standards more applicable
with norms that protect minors in the criminal procedure resulted in the emergence
of important changes in the military legislation. Among these was raising the
majority age from sixteen to eighteen, 290 separating minors and adults in detention
facilities,29 1 reducing periods of detention before being brought before a judge,2 92
and relying on welfare reports in criminal trials. 293 Nevertheless, criticism of the
application of these changes in practice point out that the changes do not
encompass remand procedures and that the punishments meted out by the military
courts reflect more a consideration of retribution than of rehabilitation.
Finally, we suggest that the co-application of human rights law and
international humanitarian law, while taking into consideration the security needs
of both the occupying power and the protected persons, would create legal
standards that would see the application of more protections for minors in criminal
procedures. This proposal is also supported by the local Palestinian Authority
Child Law, which promotes a concept of childhood under criminal law adhering to
the values and norms of human rights law that are anchored in human rights law
treaties, and especially in the CRC.2 94 Yet, since Israel objects to a formal
application of human rights treaties in the administered territories, the practical
application of human rights law in these territories is rather through military
legislation that absorbs human rights norms than through the application of human
rights treaties.
286. See CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, § 1(1)(c).
287. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 10(2)(b).
288. HRW Report, supra note 156.
289. As opposed to special arrangements regarding sentencing that allow the serving of custodial
sentences in an institute of social care. Order Regarding the Judgment of Young Offenders (No.132)
(Isr.) (translated by author).
290. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676, § 3 (Amend.
No. 10) (Isr.), available at http://www.dci-palestine.org/sites/default/files/militaryorder 1676.pdf
(unofficial translation) (amending article 136 of Order Regarding Security No. 1651).
291. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644, art. 46(L)(d) (Amend.
No. 109) (Isr.) (adding to Order Regarding Security No. 1651).
292. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1685 (Amend. No. 16)
(lsr.) (translated by author).
293. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644 (lsr.), art. 46(L)(c).
294. See Draft Youth Protection Act 2011, art. 2 (Palestine); CRC, supra note 1, arts. 37, 39, 40.
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Nevertheless, and even though it does not seem that the Israeli belligerent
occupation in the administered territories will end in the near future, it is crucial to
maintain that a belligerent occupying power, including a long-term one, should
avoid changes that will render it a sovereign. While this objective is justified for a
transformative regime, such as that in Iraq, it works against the purposes of a longterm belligerent occupant. Hence, any changes of legislation made by the
occupying power, such as those suggested in this article, must pertain to the basic
tenet of belligerent occupation regime, wherein the roles of the occupying power
should be limited to maintain the order and safety and the civil life routine of the
occupied territory and population.

